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Parti. Marxist* Humanism
The post-war years in France saw a great swing 
towards Marxism. After the defeat of Germany the 
reactionary governments of country after country 
collapsed and were swept aside. Everywhere socialism 
was on the ascendant. In Western Europe too the 
tide of socialist thought flowed strongly and there 
was a great upsurge o f Marxist writings. This was 
greatly influenced by the philosophical theories of 
those central-European Marxists who had re­
discovered the Hegelian basis of M arx’s thought, 
notably Lukacs and Korsch. The hitherto unknown 
texts of the M arx of 1844 which had first appeared in 
the thirties but were lost sight of during the War 
were being translated and eagerly read and studied.
Such works as Sartre’s Existential Marxism  
became popular with its emphasis on commitment as 
the realisation o f the “authentic” person. M ounier’s 
“personalism” represented a parallel movement of a 
humanist kind which found support in the notion of 
alienation, which Lukacs emphasised as part of the 
essential Hegelianism of Marx.
Two diverging trends became evident. While one 
strongly held to  the whole corpus of M arx’s writing, 
but found in them a humanism which had been 
missed, a t the same time emphasising the importance 
of Hegel for a  real understanding of Marx, the other 
counterposed the recently studied works of the 
younger M arx to  the established and familiar texts
* M arx, In troduction  to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy  
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of the older, interpreting the earlier writings in terms 
of a moralistic humanism and o f an existentialism 
which laid stress on the importance of the human 
will (of voluntarism) and personal decision as the 
effective force in revolutionary change. They 
regarded the later and now generally accepted works 
of Marx, such as Capital, as reflecting a decline of 
M arx’s ideas into determinism and a preoccupation 
with economics. For them the real Marx was 
finished somewhere around 1845.
Althusser’s fo r  Marx
The growing influence of the early Marx, both in 
the existentialist Marxism of Sartre and in Marxist 
humanism, was countered by the appearance in 1965 
of Louis Althusser’s Pour M arx  (For Marx), which 
comprised a series of articles which had begun to 
appear in 1960. This was followed by his Preface to 
Capital in 1969, an essay on the Reading o f  Capital, 
and an interview in Pensee. These essays stirred up a 
considerable controversy: and both in France and in 
Britain he now has devoted disciples.
Althusser, a former Catholic, has been a member 
of the French Communist Party for some 20 years. 
He is a lecturer in philosophy at the Ecole Normale 
Superieure.
His strategy is a bold one. He advances an 
interpretation of Marxism which is directed both at 
the existentialist humanists on the one hand, and, on 
the other, at all those Marxists who, while remaining 
in the central tradition of Marxist thought, are 
nevertheless profoundly influenced by the Hegelian 
and humanist philosophy of the young Marx.
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Althusser’s position is that Marx in 1845 totally 
abandoned all his early views as Hegelian and 
idealist, and thereafter they play no part at all in his 
writings. These Hegelian conceptions include 
“alienation” , “ the negation of the negation” and 
“supersession” (Aufhebung)1.
Among the idealist notions which he now once and 
for all abandoned were two others: the Marxist 
theory o f historical development, which Althusser 
calls “ Hegelian-evolutionism” ; and Marxist 
humanism: the concepts of “m an” and “hum an­
ism” , says Althusser, are terms whereby M arx never 
again thought reality, after 1845.2 They must give 
place to what he calls “ Marxist anti-humanism” .
This, certainly demolishes both existentialist 
Marxism and moralist theories of socialism: but do 
we not pay a rather high price for it? It is not the 
best cure for a toothache to cut off the patient’s 
head. N ot only has revisionism been overthrown, 
but the whole Hegelian heritage that Marx himself, 
as late as 1873, still regarded as fundamental. In 
fact everything we have hitherto known as Marxism 
has gone, and in its place all that is left is a static and 
scholastic parody of the Marxist method.
The “Break”
Althusser’s arguments rest on the basic assump­
tion that after the Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts 
o f  18443 which in Althusser’s opinion represent the 
high-water m ark of M arx’s Hegelianism, there 
was a sudden and dramatic “ break” with all his 
previous thinking. The German Ideology, which 
Marx and Engels wrote in 1845, marks, according to 
him, the abandonment of these earlier views and the 
establishment of his final “ scientific” position. This 
is the “ break” . Discussing the 1844 Manuscripts, 
Althusser says:
“Marx is furthest from Marx in this book. It is 
Marx on the brink of change, on the eve, on the 
threshold—giving the philosophy he was on the 
point of giving up a last chance” .4
He speaks of M arx’s “sudden and total return” to 
Hegel in the 1844 Manuscripts, followed by its 
complete rejection in the German Ideology, where 
we see:
“Thoughts in a state of rupture with the past, 
playing a pitiless game of deadly criticism with all its 
erstwhile theoretical suppositions” .5
1 T h is im portan t Hegelian concept represents the “over­
coming" or “supersession" of one historical and economic 
phase by the nex t which nevertheless carries over on to  the  
new level in  a m odified form w hat was achieved in  the 
earlier. T h e  essential notion is th a t of “going beyond” or 
“ transcending” capitalism , its basic structure , its economic 
laws, and its ideology. T h e  Germ an word for th is is 
A ufhebung .
2 For M arx, p. 244.
3 First published in 1932. T h e  first English transla tion  a p ­
peared in 1951.
* For M arx, p. 159.
5 Ib id , p. 36.
This story is a complete myth. What evidence is 
there for this “ break” ? Althusser claims that Marx 
himself announced the rejection of his former views 
when he says in the Preface to the Critique o f  
Political Economy that in the German Ideology “ we 
settled accounts with our former philosophical 
consciences” . Marx goes on to say that after their 
publisher refused to print it, having taken fright at 
the author’s reputation, he and Engels “abandoned 
the manuscript to the gnawing criticism of mice” . It
was indeed shelved, forgotten, and never published 
until 1932.6
But is this remark about “settling accounts” 
evidence for a “ break” ? Why if it was here that he 
reversed his whole position did he never publish it ? 
But further, Althusser rests his case on the content 
of the book itself, in which we are to find all M arx’s 
previous writings contradicted and the doctrines of 
the mature Marx enunciated. Is this the case? N ot in 
the least. So far from refuting his earlier views in the 
Manuscripts of the previous year, M arx continues 
and develops their argument, announces no diver­
gence, no repudiation of these views.
Take first M arx’s Hegelianism. W hat exactly was 
this? It was firstly what Marx believed to be a 
permanent and vital element in the understanding 
of man and his world—the notion that in creating 
his own world by labour, man creates himself; 
secondly, comes Hegel’s theory of alienation—that 
m an’s labour somehow resulted in loss as well as 
gain, a  deprivation, a loss o f humanity; thirdly, that 
in due course man overcomes or transcends aliena­
tion, recovers and fulfils himself. These are all 
Hegelian concepts, and they are all Marxian 
concepts. But what Marx did with them was to 
show that they must be understood in relation to 
m an’s material life in the real world. Thus we escape 
the mystification which Hegel himself is responsible 
for when he treats the whole process as the mani­
festation of the Idea. But Marx never abandons 
these three principles. Enunciated in the M anu­
scripts of 1844, they are expanded and developed in 
the German Ideology, and embodied and made 
concrete in Capital.
N or when we turn back to the Manuscripts do we 
find “ the high-water mark of Hegelianism” , the 
“ idealism” from which Marx is supposed to free 
himself, the “ total return to  Hegel” , which Althusser 
sees there, in which “ the whole of nature is derived 
from logical abstraction” . On the contrary, we find 
the theory of man creating his world himself through 
his labour, which Marx accepts from Hegel and 
maintains through all his later work, but treats 
materialistically as meaning that all history is m an’s 
self-creation.
We find here in the Manuscripts, rather than in the 
German Ideology, in the essay entitled “ Critique o f
* An English translation  of the  first p a rt appeared  in 1958, 
and the first com plete English translation  in  1964.
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the Hegelian Dialectic as a Whole” , which Althusser 
appears never to have read, M arx’s fundamental 
criticism o f Hegel. I t is in this essay, rather than in 
the later work, that Marx “settles his accounts” 
with Hegel as, indeed, he tells us in the Preface to 
the second edition of Capital. But, as he explains, 
“ settling accounts” with Hegel is not rejecting him. 
(any more than the phrase itself would mean in 
business). M arx tells us what he accepted and what 
he rejected. H e accepted the unity of the subjective 
and the objective in knowledge, but he rejected the 
derivation of the material world and history from 
The Idea. All this is in the Manuscripts itself, not in 
the German Ideology.
Marx and Alienation
It is here also that Marx raises the question of 
alienation, which Althusser describes as a  purely 
Hegelian conception. It is true that Hegel sees it as a 
feeling of deprivation or loss resulting from m an’s 
creation o f the object over against himself—a purely 
subjective affair. Marx while he accepts the fac t of 
alienation, explicitly rejects this explanation and 
gives it an economic interpretation. But does he, as 
Althusser says, now reject it so completely that “no 
trace of this Hegelian category appears in the Marx 
of 1857” ?
On the contrary, it immediately reappears in the 
German Ideology—the work in which Marx is 
supposed to have submitted it to “ pitiless and deadly 
criticism” . On the contrary here it plays the central 
role which it continues to play in all M arx’s sub­
sequent work.
Althusser declares that M arx’s treatment of 
alienation in the Manuscripts is purely Hegelian, 
that it remains on the purely subjective level, 
alienation being the very form and existence o f pure 
M ind in the course of its development. Is this really 
M arx’s view of alienation in the Manuscripts? Let 
us turn to  the very first page o f this work, where 
Marx explains what to  him, alienation, really is.
“ W ages a re  determ ined  th rough  th e  an tagon istic  
struggle betw een cap ita list and  w orker. V ictory  goes 
necessarily  to  the capita list. T he  cap ita list can  live 
longer w ithou t the w orker th an  can th e  w orker 
w ithou t th e  cap ita lis t” , and  so o n .7
This first essay is on Wages; the second on the 
Profit o f  Capital', the third on the Rent o f  Land. 
Then we come to Alienated Labour, and what does 
Marx say about that ?
“ O n th e  basis o f  political econom y, in  its own 
w ords, we have show n th a t the w orker sinks to  the level 
o f  a  com m odity  and  becom es indeed the m ost 
w retched o f  com m odities” .
Where is the subjective idealism? Where are the 
“pure abstractions” ?
Clearly this is not the Hegelian view of alienation 
but M arx’s economic explanation, and he brings it
T Economic and Philosophical M anuscripts, p t .
forward in opposition not only to Hegel but to the 
ideas of Feuerbach as well.
O f course Marx owed a great deal to Feuerbach 
who showed that so far from the material world 
owing its being to the idea, our ideas arise from our 
comprehension of the material world. As he says:
“ I d o  n o t  g e n e ra te  th e  o b jec t fro m  th e  th o u g h t, b u t 
th e  th o u g h t fro m  th e  o b je c t:  a n d  1 h o ld  th a t  a lo n e  
to  be  a n  o b je c t w h ich  h as  a n  ex is ten ce  b e y o n d  o n e 's  
b r a in " .8
But Marx rejected Feuerbach’s religious ex­
planation of alienation, which was that m an felt 
deprived, unworthy and sinful, because he had 
projected his real humanity upon the deity. Marx 
had already replied, in an earlier essay,9 that on the 
contrary it was not because men were religious that 
they were alienated, but because of the grievous 
conditions under which they laboured that they 
turned to  religion for consolation.
Thus Althusser is wrong again. Marx is not under 
the influence of Feuerbach’s Hegelian errors, he is 
refuting him.
Feuerbach’s Theory of Man
But what about Feuerbach’s very abstract theory 
of Man and human nature? Althusser declares that 
in the Manuscripts Marx is guilty of accepting this 
fundamental Hegelian error of Feuerbach’s and that 
he only escapes from this after his conversion to 
materialism in 1845.
This is not the case. It is precisely in the Manu­
scripts that Marx refutes this notion of Feuerbach 
too, and we find “ the concept of the human species 
brought down from the sky, the abstraction to the 
real ground of earth” . Marx sees man as developing 
and realising his personality as he wrests his living 
from the earth, and thus makes himself.
What then does M arx mean when he uses the term 
“ species m an” ? M arx’s conception of man is that he 
is essentially a social being—“species m an” . The 
human essence, says Marx, “ is no abstraction 
inherent in each individual” , (which is Althusser’s 
idea of Marx’s understanding of “ M an”). “ In 
reality, it is the ensemble of social relations.” But 
this, says Althusser, “ means nothing at all” .10 Any 
comparative psychologist, however, would explain 
that man,unlike som esolitarypredators,is essentially 
a  social animal who becomes himself in society by 
accepting its obligations and receiving its social 
benefits, following the acceptance by others of those 
obligations to create, serve and maintain the human 
fellowship. In a capitalist society man is still “ the 
ensemble of social relations” , but the co-operative 
relations are contradicted and in part nullified by 
competitive relations. M an becomes himself only in
s Feuerbach, T h e  Essence o f Christianity. 
s Introduction  to the C ritique of Hegel’s Philosophy of R igh t. 
in For M arx, p. 243.
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the pattern of social relations found in common 
ownership and social control of production for the 
common good11. This is what Marx means by “ the 
concept of the human species brought down from 
the sky of abstraction to the real ground of earth; 
what else is it if not the concept of society ?” 12
It is remarkable that Althusser should turn a blind 
eye on the concept of alienation in the German 
Ideology work, for it is an essential part of the whole 
of M arx’s argument here.13 Marx uses two words for 
this no tion : Entfremdung is used when his intention is 
to emphasise the fact that man is being opposed by 
a hostile power of his own making: Entausserung 
when the emphasis is on “externalisation” or 
“ objectification” o f this power, as in the capitalist 
“ m arket” .
Turning to  the German Ideology from which, 
says Althusser, the Idea has been completely 
banished, we read that in class society “ M an’s own 
deed becomes an alien power opposed to him, which 
enslaves him instead of being controlled by him ” . 
Marx goes on to speak of the “consolidation of what 
we ourselves produce into an objective power above 
us, growing out of our control, thwarting our 
expectations, bringing to naught our calculations 
. . “This alienation", he continues, has become 
“ an intolerable power, a power against which men 
make a revolution” because it rests upon the fact that 
the great mass of humanity have been rendered 
propertyless.14 We recall that the first four essays of 
the Manuscripts were devoted to precisely this 
explanation of alienation, and here it is again in the 
German Ideology.
In Capital in which the term again appears, the 
economic form which M arx had given it from the 
first is further developed in the theory of m an’s 
labour power as a “commodity” , which, inseparable 
as it is from man himself, is bought and sold in the 
market. But this is not to abandon the notion of 
alienation, for it is how Marx.explained it from the 
first, in the Manuscripts. This is clearly shown if we 
turn to  the passages in which he first discusses it.
“In the purchase of men's labour we purchase the 
man with his labour and he becomes a mere tool or 
instrument for our ends—a commodity, a thing. The 
man who becomes a wage labourer finds that his 
real personality no longer exists even for himself.”15 
In the im portant Grundrisse, or Outlines o f  a Critique 
o f  Political Economy, written in 1857 (the date which 
Althusser regards as heralding the “ m ature” Marx, 
now completely free from Hegelianism), Marx is 
still using the hateful term.
There are over 300 occasions on which he explicitly 
refers to it by the original term, alienation, in this
11 Economic and Philosophic M anuscripts.
12 M arx, Collected Works, Vol. 27, p. 425. (Germ an edition).
13 T h ere  are references to  "alienation” and  “estrangem ent” 
on  pages 21, 23, 24, 27, and 28 of the  Pascal transla tion  of 
1938. I t  is the  them e ru n n in g  through the whole of Part 1.
14 Germ an Ideology.
15 M arx, Economic and Philosophic M anuscripts.
work, and frequently does so in long and important 
paragraphs. All through Capital the emancipation of 
man from alienation and the fulfilment of his 
personality is the constant theme. Alienation, 
indeed, might well be described as the basic theme of 
the whole of M arx’s life-work from its early be­
ginnings in the Essays o f 1842 to the day o f his death.
Lenin also wholly accepts M arx’s theory of 
alienation as expressed in the Manuscripts of 1844. 
O f course he had not seen them (they were un­
published), but Marx had transcribed the essential 
pages on alienation into the Holy Family, and Lenin 
wholly endorses the theory as he found it there.16
Althusser’s “ Theoretical Anti-humanism”
On no other topic does Althusser’s intellectualism 
appear more barren than on the question of hum an­
ism in Marxism. It cannot be denied that Marx 
himself affirms his humanist faith frequently and 
explicitly in his earlier works, and that there is no 
more warmly humanist analysis of the cruelties and 
inhumanities o f capitalism than Capital itself. This 
Lenin recognised. He had no sympathy with the 
view that the humanism in Capital is alien to 
Marxism and should be extruded.
“In few scientific treatises will you find so much 
heart, so many burning and passionate polemical 
outbursts. It depicts capitalist society as a living 
thing with the actual social manifestation of the 
antagonistic classes in the relations of production.”17
Of course, we are well aware of the possibility of a 
rapid, emotional kind of uplift which can call itself 
humanism, but its existence seems a poor reason for 
eliminating the basic concern for humanity from 
socialism. To strip Marxism of its concern for man, 
for human interests, for the fulfilment of human 
aspirations and the human personality would be to 
deny everything that Marx, and after him  Lenin, 
stood for. Humanism, and faith in man, was never 
for Marx the theory of “abstract” man, though that 
is Althusser’s whole point. But it was Marx himself 
in his earlier writings, these very writings which 
Althusser characterises as idealist, as treating man 
as an abstraction, who criticises Feuerbach for this 
error—not however, to reject humanism, but to 
make it concrete, historical and linked with the 
technological advance of developing man.
One cannot turn to any work o f Marx without 
entering immediately into the hum an problem. In 
1843 we find him proclaiming “ the doctrine that man 
is the supreme being for man . . . therefore with the 
categorical imperative to  overthrow all those 
conditions in which man is an abased, enslaved, 
abandoned, contemptible being.”18 Althusser re­
gards this as “ abstract, illusory, utopian and 
idealist.” He condemns it a s :
is  Lenin, Conspectus o f the H oly  Family, Collected W orks, 
Vol. 38.
17 Lenin, Karl M arx, Collected Works, Vol. 18.
18 Marx. Critique o f Hegel's Philosophy o f R ight.
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“ the recourse to ethics so deeply inscribed in 
every human ideology (which) plays a part only in 
the imaginary treatment of real problems.”19
We m ust learn in these matters, he says, to use our 
scientific concepts, value free, excluding moral 
considerations and humanistic ideas.
M arx regards the whole process from the stand­
point o f values. He roots the inhumanity he con­
demns in the wage system of capitalism and the sale 
and purchase of labour power as a commodity.
Althusser has never noticed that one of the 
longest essays in the Manuscripts, is Engels’ Outlines 
o f  a Critique o f  Political Economy, which occupies 
34 pages. This was M arx’s first introduction to 
capitalist political economy and to the crises its 
m arket system involves. Engels show th a t:
“ . . .  in the last instance private property has turned 
man into a commodity whose production and 
destruction also depend solely on demand. The 
system of competition has thus slaughtered, and 
daily continues to slaughter, millions of men. All this 
we have seen, and all this drives us to the abolition 
of this degradation of mankind through the abolition 
o f private property, competition and the opposing 
interests.” 20
O f course, both Marx and Engels had still a long 
way to  go in their analysis of capitalism; but this is a 
masterly beginning. Is all this “abstract”, “ philo­
sophical” , “ illusory” ?
“ Truly Human” Man
M arx immediately follows this with the important 
argum ent in The Holy Family, which demonstrates 
that “ the empirical world must be arranged so that 
in it m an may at last be able to experience himself 
as truly hum an” .21 The whole of the German 
Ideology is concerned with this very problem, for the 
alienation of m an’s condition under capitalism 
arises because:
“ . . .  we have themajorityofindividuals from whom 
these forces have been wrested away, who robbed 
them of all life content, have become abstract 
individuals.” 22
It is not M arx who treats man as an abstraction, it is 
capitalism! And it is Althusser’s empiricism! To free 
the account o f m an’s economic and social condition 
from “values” , “ethical considerations” and 
“ humanism” , is not being scientific. It is the worst 
form  of abstractionism.
Alienation is overcome by the social ownership 
of these forces.
19 For M arx, pp . 242, 247.
20 Engels, O utline  of a C ritique of Political Econom y  from 
th e  Econom ic and Philosophic M anuscripts of 1844.
21 T h e  H oly  Family, p. n 6 .
22  Germ an Ideology, p. 66. Althusser has assured us th a t with 
the  final rejection of Hegelian thought which is the  essence 
of th e  “G erm an Ideology”, M arx has finished w ith alienation. 
On th e  contrary, it is the  constant them e of th e  book, and 
of th e  Grundisse, and of Capital.
It is in Capital that M arx’s humanism reaches its 
full realisation, that this understanding of the 
economic nature of alienation is now expanded into 
those moving chapters on the factory system, 
burning with indignation, which make this work so 
much more than an analytical exposition of economic 
and social structure. The ultimate appropriation of 
the means of production by the community achieves 
“ the realisation of the person” . Now “ begins that 
development of human power which is its own true 
end . . . the full development of the human race” , of 
“species m an” , the realisation of “m an’s necessity 
to develop himself.” 23
And this is anathema to Althusser. He emphatically 
declares that after M arx’s conversion in 1845, i.e., 
the rejection of the Hegelianism of the Manuscripts, 
Marx never again introduces the concepts of man or 
humanism.24
“The absolute precondition for the positive 
knowledge of the world itself and its transformation, 
and of knowing anything about man is “ that the 
philosophical myth of man is reduced to ashes!”25
This rejection of humanism carries with it for 
Althusser the elimination of man as the agent of 
historical development, and of the necessity of the 
rise of historical consciousness in the proletariat, 
which was for Marx the indispensible pre-requisite 
of socialism.
Althusser asserts that “ the whole classical 
Marxist tradition has refused to say that it is man 
who makes history.26
To which Marx replies:
“ It is man, real living man, that makes history; 
history is not a person apart, using man as a means 
for its own particular aims: history is nothing but 
the activity of man pursuing his aims.”27
Marx refutes Althusser’s “ theoretical anti­
humanism” in the same argument, for he declares 
that “ the entire history of the world is nothing but 
the begetting of men through human labour” . “ By 
activity in the world, and changing it, he at the same 
time changes his own nature and develops the 
potentialities that slumber within him” .28 Thus, 
m an’s making of his world is at the same time his 
making and re-making of himself and his achieve­
ment of his own full development as m an.29
23 Capital, Vol. I. pp . 554-708 and Vol. III . p . 945.
24 For M arx, p. 244.
25 For M arx, p. 299.
26 Althusser, Interview  in  La Pensee, April, 1968.
27 Marx, T h e  H oly Family.
28 Capital, Vol. I, and M anuscripts.
29 For Althusser social transform ation is the  effect of p re ­
determ ined economic developm ent of an  autom atic nature.. 
If m en play any p a rt it is only because their actions are in 
th e  last resort determ ined by the  economic factor.
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Part- 2
We have ceased to read Hegel, andthat is why for the past ha lf century none o f  the M arxists has understood M arx1.
Lenin
Two philosophical trends unite in Marx, and are 
both transform ed by him. The first is the materialist 
tradition, British (Bacon, Hobbes and Locke) and 
French (Descartes, Gassendi). The second is the 
Germ an classical philosophy of K ant, Fichte and 
Hegel.
The im portance of materialism was its rejection 
of everything beyond the natural world, whether 
supernatural agencies, tendencies moving to some 
goal, or entities like the “ vital force” of Bergson, 
Shaw and the vitalists. M aterialism also laid proper 
stress on the importance o f the environment in the 
making of man, but could never explain, how in that 
case, the environment could be transformed by 
those who were themselves made and constituted 
by it in mind and character!
Marx was a  materialist, but in two respects he 
disagreed with the materialism of his day. H e did 
not accept the prevalent view that the mind is a 
blank sheet on which the material world makes its 
impressions. On the contrary, M an knows what he 
makes, and changes his environment by the knowing 
and activity which is his life. Therefore M an’s 
objective and subjective life are united— M an does 
not stand over against his world trying to  make out 
what it is. He makes it—though its physical priority 
is unquestionable. Thus M arx asserts that in these 
respects he rejects “all previous materialism” .2
But the fact that he is a  materialist by no means 
implies that M arx rejects the tradition o f Germ an 
classical philosophy and its culmination in Hegel. 
On the contrary, of this philosophical tradition the 
working class movement, said Engels, is the true 
inheritor.3 But, as was the case with materialism, 
M arx’s critique is an evaluation which both preserves 
and rejects. M arx accepts from Hegel his belief that 
reality is not as it appears to empirical reflection, 
and rejects every form of empiricism. There is 
inseparable interaction o f M an and his material 
world in every fact of knowledge. Mind and action 
are creative. Marx further joins Hegel in treating as 
“ merely empirical” and to be “ overcome” every 
mode of reality which presents an obstacle to  the 
unfolding of M an’s potentialities. The world is to  be 
transform ed; not by an appeal to eternal principles, 
or by the unfolding of the Idea—the sole reality— 
but by the progressive unfolding o f its own material 
and hum an possibilities. But that the ultimate 
reality is Mind or Reason, and the material world a
1 Collected Works, Vol. 38, Philosophical Notebooks.
2 M arx, Theses on Feuerbach, No. 1.
* Engels, Feuerbach.
derivate from it, M arx wholly rejects: speaking of 
his acceptance of the idea of M an making his 
world, he says that “ O f course in all this the priority 
of external nature remains unassailed” .4 History 
was both for M arx and Hegel the story of M an’s 
self-creation, not a  record o f events passively 
reflected in the mind.
Hegel’s Contribution
As the triumph of rationality over brute existence, 
Hegelian idealism and the earlier materialist 
tradition happily combine, and the transition to 
Marxism represents in every respect a  radical break 
in the continuity of nineteenth century thought.
Marx regards the emphasis on the “active side of 
knowledge” as Hegel’s im portant contribution to 
the theory of knowledge, which they both saw as 
acquired not by reflection, but in manipulating, 
using and changing the world—associated with the 
pervasive idea of the self-creation of M an as a 
process in which the principal factor is M an’s own 
labour. This is the basic theme of the first section of 
the German Ideology, which far from eliminating the 
basic Hegelian concepts, integrates them in materia­
listic form into the very substance of Marxism.
This in fact is the “kernel” which Marx says, in 
the Preface to Capital, he extracts from Hegel; or to 
use another figure of speech, “ sets Hegel on his 
feet.”
W hat precisely does this mean ? It has sometimes 
been interpreted rather simplistically as asserting 
merely that m atter comes before mind, or that 
thought arises as the consciousness o f material 
objects. It has even been supposed Hegel was “ put 
on his feet” when the self-unfolding of the concept 
was embodied in nature and history. But that would 
indeed have been a return to the pure metaphysics 
of Hegelian idealism. Marx means by it—seeing the 
development of Man and Society in the interaction 
of creative thought with the environment, showing 
the theory as essentially the realistic process of 
getting one’s subsistence in the material world by 
labour, invention and organisation. This is developed 
in the German Ideology, which is by no means the 
work in which M arx’s thought “ is in a state of 
rupture with the past” , and “all its erstwhile theo­
retical presuppositions” are discarded, as Althusser 
says. On the contrary, it is where M arx’s inversion 
of Hegel is established and fully expounded.
Althusser has a  very defective understanding of 
Hegel, seeing in his philosophy no more than “ the
* Marx-Engels, German Ideology.
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identification of thought and being” ,6 and the pos­
tulation of “ a  simple organic unity which develops 
within itself by the virtue of its negativity” .6
Whereas for Marx the unification of the subjective 
and the objective is the modification and saturation 
of what we know with our way of knowing it, with 
the conditions and the activity involved in knowing 
in order to act; and “ the simple original unity” is 
reached in the realisation that there is only one 
world and it contains thinking M an and his material 
environment in continuous interaction.
Marx saw in the approximation of society to a 
rational goal the gradual disappearance of the 
ideologies o f religion, of utopia, and o f reassuring 
philosophies, which are all compensations for the 
materialism o f the times. But you cannot abolish the 
illusions of religion, said Marx, (or any o f the other 
illusions), until you abolish the evils which make the 
illusion necessary. Utopian hopes play the same 
role as religion, and so do philosophies which only 
assure us that “ reality” is so much better than it 
appears to be! All these ideologies are useful and 
necessary illusions; but they will disappear when 
we know how to change the world, instead of 
explaining it and kidding ourselves with fantasies.
Man and His World: “ The Grundrisse” 7
The acceptance of the dialectical process of social 
development means for Marx the alteration of the 
environment by men's activities and the adaptation 
of our economy and our ideas to the environment 
we have thus created; the impact of that new economy 
in further changing the environment, leading to 
further changes in the economy, the superstructure 
and the very nature of Man. All this is the Hegelian 
theme of all M arx’s mature work; and most com­
pletely in the only comprehensive treatise on his 
theories as a whole (of which Capital was only the 
first unfinished fragments), the 1,000 page Grini- 
drisse of 1857, the most fundamental work that Marx 
ever wrote, “ the result of 15 years o f research, thus 
the best period of my life” , as he said.
The Grundrisse, the work o f M arx’s complete 
maturity, is Hegelian in the aboVe sense, through 
and through.
Althusser never mentions the Grundrisse. Indeed 
he cannot. F or appearing as M arx’s m ature work, 
it is a complete exposition of the whole series of 
concepts which Althusser has removed from 
Marxism as worthless.
It contains a  synthesis of the various strands of 
M arx’s thought, beginning with the outlines of the 
substance o f all four volumes of Capital. And it 
could well be described as the exposition of authentic 
Marxism, and as marking the crucial stage in the 
development of his thought. Any discussion of
5 For M arx, p . 189.
« Ibid, p . 197.
t  Grundisse der K ritik  des Politischen O ekonom ie (Rohent- 
wurf) O utlines of the C ritique of Political Economy (Rough 
draft) .
Marxism that does not take account of the Grun­
drisse is doomed from the start.
Althusser by his own critical attitude includes it 
in the writings of M arx’s m aturity, coming as it 
does in 1857, but since it includes the whole series 
of Hegelian concepts (alienation, transcendence, 
negation etc.) which Althusser says Marx abandoned 
for ever in 1845, and play no part in the work of the 
m ature Marx, he simply ignores it and proceeds 
with his exposition of Marxism as though it did not 
exist!
Capital and Marx’s Theory of History
If so much of M arx’s work has been rejected by 
Althusser as worthless, what is left? His choice of 
Capital, Vol. I would certainly please the more 
traditional type of Marxist who has always thought 
of Marxism in terms of M arx’s analysis of capitalist 
contradictions.
Althusser does indeed select Capital as the source 
of the essential Marxism, but only after stripping it 
of its Hegelian accretions and distortions. His 
treatment of the book is a strange one: He is not at 
all satisfied that what we have in Capital is free from 
Hegelian defects. Almost the whole of the first 
section on “ Commodities” is unsatisfactory be­
cause, in Hegelian fashion, it is based on the his­
torical origins of “ the commodity” ; and moreover 
Marx’s theory of value is completely false.
Althusser appears to  be unaware that Lenin, 
whom he always treats as a  repository of pure and 
unsullied Marxist truth, gives his full support to 
Marx here.8 Has Lenin also confused Hegelianism 
with M arxism? Must we reject him along with the 
great first chapter on “Commodities” ?
It is a  pity that poor Marx is “ trapped in a 
Hegelian conception o f science” , and has made such 
a  mess of these conceptions of “value” and “com ­
modities” . But, far worse, in his theory of the 
“ fetishism” o f money and commodities, he has gone 
head-over-heels into it again. This “ reification” , or 
turning into a powerful and controlling entity or 
force, of “ money” , and the laws of capitalism, seems 
to Althusser a  purely Hegelian error. He says:
“The whole fashionable theory of ‘reification’ 
depends on the projection of the theory of alienation 
found in the early texts (particularly the Manuscripts 
of 1844) on to the theory of ‘fetishism’ in Capital.” 9
Marx on the other hand, sees it as the very essence 
of the capitalist system which traps men in the 
irresistible working of its laws, until they realise that 
men can be brought to  see that the whole law 
system o f capitalism and the fetishism of money and 
the commodities is an illusion. It belongs only to a 
passing epoch, it is not eternal or absolute. At the
8 See Lenin 's biographical article on M arx, Collected Works, 
1930, (Vol. XVIII).
9 For M arx, p. 230.
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right time, i f  we come to understand, we can and 
must pass beyond, supersede, transcend10 the capitalist 
economy and establish a socialist one, in which the 
production and distribution of goods is carried out 
in terms of reason and human needs, and no longer 
under the alienation and obstructive laws o f the 
commodity market. But all this appears to Althusser 
pure Hegelianism, and he will have none of it.
Marx and Historical Materialism
Readers o f Althusser’s Preface to  the French 
paper-back edition of Capital 111 must have been 
somewhat surprised at his rejection o f M arx’s 
theory o f historical development as “ Hegelian 
evolutionism” . The formulation he selects for 
criticism is not explicitly set forth in Capital itself, 
though this is the concrete exemplification o f the 
whole idea, but in the classical summary to historical 
materialism in the Preface to the Critique o f  Political 
Economy (1859). The essential paragraph, well 
known to everyone, opens with these w ords:
“In the social production which men carry on 
they enter into definite relations that are indis­
pensable and independent of their will” .
Marx then develops this dialectical conception of 
historical development to show that the enlarged 
forces o f production (technology) come into conflict 
with the relations o f production (the wage system, 
capitalism) which fetter and limit the potentialities 
available. Now follows the reconstruction o f society 
to bring the economic structure into line with these 
potentialities.
This is the dialectic of reciprocal interaction 
between the technology and the men operating it on 
the one hand, and the economic system on the other. 
Marx then goes on to show that it is in the struggle 
of ideas that Man leads the way to this transfor­
m ation for it is by no means an autom atic economic 
process. It is fought out, says Marx, in ideological 
forms.
Althusser describes this whole passage as saturated 
with Hegelian evolutionism, and as a dangerous 
source of ideas which “ have caused havoc in the 
working class movement” . He continues:
“ Not for a single moment did Lenin succumb to 
the influence of these Hegelian-evolulionist pages” .12
Had he done so, says Althusser, Lenin would have 
been hindered in his battle with the Second Inter­
national, nor could he have won power in Russia, 
or begun the construction of socialism.13
Now the astonishing thing is that Lenin not only
10 T h e  words which Althusser will have no th ing  to  do  with 
regarding them  as wholly idealistic.
11 M arx, Le Capital, Livre I (Paris 1969) with A lthusser’s 
Preface.
12 Preface to the  paperback Capital.
13 Althusser, Preface to  Capital.
warmly approved these pages, but quoted them in 
extenso in his essay on M arx14 describing them as
“ . . . the integral formulation of the fundamental 
principles of materialism as applied to human 
society and its history” .
and elsewhere he describes them as “ formulated on 
the basis of Hegel’s philosophy".16
W hat emerges in this criticism is Althusser’s 
objection to the notion of evolutionary change in 
which the agency is not the economic factor “ in the 
last resort” , but the human intelligence and will, the 
movement of history by the capacity of Men to 
transcend the laws of their society and to re-build 
the structure. This he describes (and misrepresents) 
as “ the original unity which develops within itself” .
But Marx never considered social evolution in the 
sense of the development o f the imminent Idea, nor 
did he think of it as a logical unfolding within nature 
and history operating without the consciousness 
and will of Man. Althusser would appear to sec 
social change as resulting “ in the last resort” from 
the development of the contradictions of capitalism 
in an almost autom atic manner, certainly in a 
deterministic fashion. But for Marx capitalism does 
not break down and transform itself into socialism 
automatically. Men have to discover what has gone 
wrong, how the internal contradictions arise, and
why they cannot be finally overcome unless they set 
to work and change the pattern of society. Once 
again Man re-makes Society.
Althusser does not believe in evolutionary change 
based on the development of proletarian political 
consciousness; for this essentially Hegelian approach 
he substitutes the positivism of building a theoretical 
structure based on the scientific observation of 
economic facts, a “retreat” which he admits comes 
“within a handsbreadth of positivism” .16
This includes Marxism in the kind of science 
which apprehends data and their regular sequences, 
and thus arrives at general laws. This is not even 
true of the physical sciences as they are understood 
today; it is wholly untrue of the science of social 
development.
The upshot of Althusser’s positivism is the 
creation of a new system of theoretical abstraction, 
a system stripped of its humanism, its consciousness, 
the laws of motion, as described in the Preface, its 
evolutionary historicism, a conceptual system which 
is to be the guide to  practice. This system was never 
created by Marx, Althusser argues; it is, however, 
implicit in the structure of Capital, and it is our task 
to extract it and build it up into a system.
14 Volum e XVIII, Collected W orks (1930), p . 25.
l® L en in ’s Collected Works (1930 Edition), Vol. X V III, p. 25. 
Lenin also quotes the  Preface a t length in W hat the Friends 
of the  People Are, “ Essential of L en in”, Vol. I, p. 81.
18 For M arx, p. 187.
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Is there a Marxist System?
It is im portant that we should at once compare 
this with M arx’s own method. He does not present 
us with any system. Had he thought one necessary 
he would certainly have constructed one. What he 
has in mind is the development of consciousness, of 
understanding, of the possibilities, the problems,
- the opportunities and necessities in the actual social 
situation. This Marx calls praxis, because it is 
always concrete, always we are involved and acting, 
and therefore thinking as we act, and acting as we 
think. There is no fixed theoretical structure existing 
outside the concrete situation, but a  situation that 
changes as we act, because we act; and so instantly 
demands a re-examination, a new understanding, 
and a new reaction. This is the philosophy o f the 
working hypothesis.
Marx also put his whole emphasis on the working 
class, (or a  leading section of it able to inform ?.nd 
carry with them the rank-and-file,) coming to this 
higher level o f consciousness at which men become 
able for the first time deliberately and consciously 
to make their own history. This is a constant 
repetition of “ going beyond” the present pattern 
and its laws. It demands at each step the human 
option, the anticipation of unaccomplished ends; 
of ends not deduced from existing structure and 
laws. This Althusser totally rejects as “subjective" 
and “spontaneous” , as ideological.
Althusser’s substitution of the system for praxis, 
leads to the disappearance of the creative man of 
history, and the arrival of “a knowledge” reserved 
for the elite, completely separated from the masses 
by the “ break” between involvement and conscious 
search for a way forward on the one hand, and the 
level of a detached system of organised abstraction on 
the other. This is a structuralism and its scientific 
laws, and is independent of human options.
The upshot is a complex and endlessly argued 
scholasticism, in which there must necessarily be a 
variety of rival and equally plausible conceptual 
constructions; and no possibility of deciding except 
by exhaustive and inconclusive arguments which is 
correct. Althusser’s disciples seem to disappear into 
the far distance of remote and never concluded 
abstract discussions. Their intellectual labours may 
remain intellectually satisfying, but they are totally 
irrelevant to the stream of events and the under­
standing of the masses who are involved in them.
What is Scientific Socialism?
Althusser opposes to the evolutionary historicism 
of Marx, and equally to Engels’ dialectical progress 
based on his laws of motion in society, his own 
version of “ scientific” social theory. This system, 
Althusser explains, was never formulated or men­
tioned by Marx. We have to elicit it from Capital, 
where it exists “ in a form which has never been 
extracted” . In fact it has to be built up, not from any 
actual statements or formulations of Marx, but
from what Marx did not say (but implied). Our 
attention has to be “ focused on absences” , for as 
far as Marx is concerned there is “silence in respect 
to the abstractions within the theoretical practice” 
of Capital. We must therefore search for “answers 
corresponding to no questions asked” .17
Therefore Althusser, rejecting Marx’s philoso­
phical approach, and accepting scientific objectivity 
as his method, analyses and describes the pre­
existing structure of capitalism and its economic 
transform ation.18 Man as active subject goes, and 
we return to a pre-Marxist form o f materialism and 
the corresponding theoretical model or conceptual 
reproduction of the world. We establish ourselves in 
the concept, possess its first principles, immutable 
and complete, from which all further truth and 
action can be deduced.
This becomes the kind of predictive determinism 
so severely criticised by Popper, and represents a 
history which unfolds in accordance with immutable 
laws based on the contradictions in the economy. 
This comes very close to metaphysical materialism,
which is itself simply the inverted form of meta­
physical idealism; the interacting forces conceived 
conceptually operating with the inevitability of an 
immanent and unfolding logic. But the notion that 
the whole of history, with its extraordinary trans­
formations, is predictable by inference from existing 
data is really quite indefensible19.
All that can be deduced from any such formu­
lation of the structure of society is that the structure 
conditions Man, and that means that the ruling 
ideas which condition Men as part of the super­
structure of a class society, represent and maintain 
that class structure and the interests of the dominant 
class. Marx himself rejected this view as the inevitable 
consequence of materialistic positivism.
“The materialist doctrine that men are products 
of circumstances . . . forgets that circumstances are 
changed precisely by men. The coincidence of the 
changing of circumstances and of human activity 
can only be conceived and rationally understood as 
revolutionising practice.20
The point is not to describe the world and accept 
its law system, but to change it.
The Marxist approach to history does not 
represent it as the autom atic consequence of the 
operation of inexorable laws, but lays down the 
guiding theory which shows that when people in a 
capitalist society become involved in certain con­
tradictions, the way to overcome them is to adapt
17 Theoretical Practice (No. 1) (T he  British Jou rna l of 
Althusser Studies).
JS Althusser adopts as the  Law of T ransform ation  the theory 
of contradictions form ulated  by Mao Tse-tung.
19 If there is any M arxist who thinks so, Popper has a most
convincing answer, b u t th e  determ inism  he refutes is not
Marxism.
*-11 Third  Thesis on Feuerbach.
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the pattern of the economy, that is its productive 
relations, their constitutions and ideas, to the 
already developed form of production. This is the 
Marxist working hypothesis, the successful operation 
of which depends on us, on our fully taking the 
variable conditions into account, on our under­
standing of the situation, on a very wide under­
standing and not merely the knowledge of an elite. 
As Cornforth says:
“ It is not, and could not be, a ‘law governed 
process’ in the strict determinist sense that there are 
pre-ordained laws which allow nothing to happen 
except what does happen.”21
This would be history without men, who are 
reduced to being no more than the medium which 
carries the pattern of social relations, not its makers.
It treats structure without reference to hum an 
option, or to the imaginative insight necessary to 
transcend any historically reached and  established 
structural pattern and conceive a totally new one. 
This is the break which depends upon anticipation of 
a course that is quite different from the one pre­
determined by existing conceptual structures, a 
venture in the making o f history which contains 
risk, responsible choice, and real historical initiative. 
The essence o f Marxism is to show how man 
transcends existing structure and the logic of that 
structure. He goes beyond current laws, which he 
sees as not absolute or eternal, but as historically 
conditioned. We remember that the one Hegelian 
concept (after alienation) that Althusser ruthlessly 
cuts out of Marxism is that of transcendence, going 
beyond, supersession (Aufhebung)', but is it not 
precisely by this that human history is made?
Althusser only finds one Marxist (M arx himself 
he sees as full of hopeless inconsistencies!) who can 
be depended upon to hold firmly to structural 
rigidity and strictly scientific objectivity, and that is 
Lenin. Lenin is presented as wholly free from 
Hegelian slipperyness, idealist moralisings and 
sentimental humanism. This he had hoped Marx 
would be too, but was sadly disappointed. However, 
Lenin, he believes, never regards any Hegelian 
concept as essential, neither negativity, alienation, 
“ supersession” , nor o f course the Hegelian fusion 
of subjectivity and objectivity. We must disappoint 
him yet again.
Lenin, after his study of Hegel, accepts his essential 
contribution to philosophy, the unification of the 
subjective and the objective in the process of 
knowing, just as Marx did.22
Lenin, as we pointed out earlier, enthusiastically 
accepts the summary of M arx’s historicist theory in
21 C ornforth , T h e  Open Philosophy and the Open Society. 
C ornforth  adds th a t we may read  righ t th rough  the  works of 
Marx and never m eet w ith any form ulation of any such 
Jaws.
22 Lenin, in Conspectus of the Holy Family, Vol. 38 (Collected 
Works).
the Preface to The Critique which Althusser rejects 
and imagines that Lenin rejects too. This bases 
social development on the changes in the productive 
relations when they become fetters on the productive 
forces. Althusser had said “ not for a moment did 
Lenin succumb to the influence of these Hegelian- 
evolutionist pages” . Lenin actually quoted them in 
full in two of his most important works, where he 
describes them as “a complete formulation of the 
fundamental theory o f historical materialism” .23
And, “ most unkindest cut of all” , instead of 
rejecting the Hegelian theory, in its materialist form, 
but still essentially what Marx always took it for, 
the dialectic of Man simultaneously creating him­
self, society and history, through his growing
awareness of the historical process, “ the realisation 
o f philosophy” by and in the proletariat, Lenin 
regards the full understanding and acceptance of 
the Hegelian tru th  in Marxism as indispensable” .
“We have ceased to read Hegel, and that is why 
none of the Marxists for the past half-century has 
understood Marx.”24
We know one French Marxist to whom this most 
signally applies.
The Althusser Style
One cannot leave Althusser without some com­
ments upon his whole style of life and writing, which 
is unusual, though more impressive than persuasive. 
He speaks as a dedicated m an and a voice crying in 
the wilderness. He gives the appearance o f wide and 
competent scholarship applied to a  totally novel, 
and in his view, desperately necessary restatement 
o f the whole Marxist position. Highly polemical, he 
at once arouses our interest by arraigning in the 
dock the enemies and heretics which it is his res­
ponsibility to expose and denounce; they are the 
philosophers, the evolutionists, the Hegelians and 
the humanists.
He argues exhaustively and with extreme dog­
matism as the last champion of an orthodoxy in 
grave difficulties. Interest is held because he has 
thought for himself, and his presentation has a 
certain independence that is more convincing than 
repetitions of well known arguments and expositions, 
which have a tired and exhaustive feeling.
There is no mistaking the basis o f his re-presen- 
tation: it claims to  be scientific as opposed to  the 
ideological theories o f the evolutionists and hum an­
ists. This is the reason for his arguments and theses 
taking on the aspect of vigorously stated empirical 
facts  and strictly logical inferences from them .26 
There is no ambiguity or subjectivism about his 
case. One would think that he is an exponent of the 
older kind of physics before Einstein took the
2* Lenin, W hat the Friends o f the People Are, and  T he 
B iographical Article on  M arx.
24 Lenin, Philosophical Notebooks.
25 A fatal re tu rn  to  em piricism , as he himself admits.
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finality and absolutism out of it. Althusser would 
clearly like Marxism to be clear, absolute and final, 
incontrovertible and unalterable.
W ith this necessarily goes the aggressive militancy 
of the man who knows he has the final truth. This 
strongly partisan spirit is refreshing and im parts to 
those who adopt it a reassuring feeling o f superiority 
and confidence.
W hat, then, is the theoretical system that has 
emerged and what is he doing about it?  U nfor­
tunately, nothing intelligible has emerged and 
nothing is being done about it. A  complete theo­
retical system is promised, but not presented. 
Instead we are told to read Capital under Althusser’s 
direction. But the secret of Marx, when we put 
down his books, has been well kept.
N or is there the kind of healthy immersion in 
everyday affairs and current issues from which clear 
insight as to what is really happening and what is to 
be done emerges, as was the case in all Lenin’s 
vigorous, concrete and practical speaking and 
writing. W hat does seem to happen is a scholastic 
retreat into greater and greater confusion and 
obscurity. W ith every fresh batch of essays the 
topic grows more recondite and the readers and 
disciples more select and fewer.26
26 I refer particu larly  to the two volumes of essays en titled  
Theoretical Practice.
The parallel with the schoolmen o f the Middle 
Ages cannot be avoided. Every purely conceptual 
system, though once it is accepted it is going to  rule 
the facts and dictate our actions, can never reach the 
certainty of unquestionable unanimity. All theoretical 
dogmatism is very far from science because it is not 
praxis, not a working hypothesis, tested and revised 
continuously in action, as for instance medicine is; 
and as Marxism is. Consequently its profound 
theorisings must take the form of an insistent 
dogmatism, or tremble on the balancing point of 
conviction, like all speculative metaphysics. And it 
must always be open to an alternative and equally 
rigorous system. That is precisely why medieval 
scholasticism disappeared within the classrooms of 
the Catholic philosophers and was for ever lost to 
sight. N or is certainty ever to be assured,—the only 
way in which dogmatism can trium ph over doubts,— 
by the increasing urgency of the assertions as to  the 
rigour and authenticity of the system.
Althusser is prepared to defend his case on the 
field of a  battle for the right word. There are two 
words in particular on which he is prepared to fight 
to the last: firstly, he refuses to adm it that Marxism 
is a humanism ; secondly, he refuses to say that it is 
Man who makes history. If these are his dogmas, 
he may keep them.
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